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Abstract. In sports competitions, teams can manipulate the result by,
for instance, throwing games. We show that we can decide how to ma-
nipulate round robin and cup competitions, two of the most popular
types of sporting competitions in polynomial time. In addition, we show
that finding the minimal number of games that need to be thrown to
manipulate the result can also be determined in polynomial time. Fi-
nally, we show that there are several different variations of standard cup
competitions where manipulation remains polynomial.
1 Introduction
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem proves that, under some modest assump-
tions, voting systems are always manipulable. One possible escape proposed by
Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick is that the manipulation may be computationally
too difficult to find [2] (but see [13] for discussion about whether manipulation
is hard not just in the worst case). Like elections, sporting competitions can also
be manipulated. For example a coalition of teams might throw games strategi-
cally to ensure that a desired team wins or a certain team loses. We consider
here the computational complexity of computing such manipulations. We show
that, for several common types of competitions, determining when a coalition
can manipulate the result is polynomial. Our results adapt manipulation proce-
dures for elections where voters can misrepresent their preferences. We consider
two of the most common methods used for deciding sporting competitions, cups
and round robins. These correspond to elections run using sequential majority
voting (also known as the cup rule) and Copeland scoring, respectively.
Manipulating a sporting competition is slightly different to manipulating an
election as, in a sporting competition, the voters are also the candidates. A
tournament graph describes the outcome of all fair games between opponents.
Manipulating a competition therefore modifies not votes but the tournament
graph directly. Since it is hard without bribery or similar mechanisms for a team
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to play better than it can, we consider manipulations where teams in the coali-
tion are only able to throw games. By comparison, in an election, voters in the
manipulating coalition can mis-report their preferences in any way they choose.
Tang, Shoham and Lin [11] addressed this type of tournament manipulation
in team competitions by providing conditions for truthful reporting of player
strengths. Their method tries to encourage teams to rank their players honestly
so that, when the teams compete in bouts, the best player on one team plays
the best on the other, the second best plays the opposing second and so forth.
An example of this type of competition is Davis Cup Tennis.
Conitzer, Sandholm and Lang [3] give an algorithm to determine if a coalition
can manipulate the cup rule. We modify this algorithm to manipulate directly
the tournament graph instead of the votes. Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [2] discuss
direct manipulations of the tournament under second order Copeland, a round
robin like rule with secondary tie breaking. Using the work of Kern and Paulusma
[7], we show that the manipulation of round robin competitions is directly tied
to the problem of winner determination in sports problems. Altman, Procaccia
and Tenneholtz [1] construct a social choice rule that is monotonic, pairwise non-
manipulable and non-imposing. Round robin and cup competitions are mono-
tonic as a single team losing a game does no better. Pairwise non-manipulability
means that no two teams are better off by manipulating the tournament. Our
results show that round robin and cup competitions are pairwise manipulable
and that manipulations can be calculated in polynomial time.
We modify our algorithms to calculate the smallest number of manipulations
needed. For cup competitions, we add dynamic programming to Conitzer, Sand-
holm and Lang’s algorithm. For round robin competitions, we modify the flow
network used to solve winner determination to include weights on manipulations
and calculate a minimum cost feasible flow. Vu, Altman and Shoham [12] used
a similar method to calculate the probability that a team wins the competi-
tion. Vu et al. [12] provide several results on determining probabilities of teams
winning given a seeding of the tournament. Hazon et al. [6] showed that it is
NP-Complete to determine if a team wins a cup with a given probability. This
is similar to determining a possible winner given random reseeding except edges
in the tournament are labelled with probabilities. We look at the complexity of
manipulation under reseeding in the deterministic case. Finally, we look at the
complexity of double elimination cups.
2 Background
In many sporting competitions, the final winner of a competition is decided by a
tree-like structure, called a cup. The most common type is a single elimination
cup, a tree structure where the root and internal nodes represent games and
leaves represent the teams in the tournament. A cup can include a bye game, a
game where a team skips a game to re-balance the schedule. Usually, the top
teams are given a bye game while the lower teams do not so that the number
of teams in the next round is strict power of two. Cups need to be seeded to
determine which teams play against each other in each round. One method for
seeding is by rank. The most common method for ranked seeding or reseeding is
to have the top team play the worst team, the second place team play the second
worst team and so forth. An example of ranked seeding using this method is the
National Basketball Association in the US. Another method for determining
seeding is randomly, also known as a draw. An example of this is the UEFA
Champions League where teams reaching the quarter finals are randomly paired
for the remainder of the tournament. Seeding may also be more complex (for
instance, it may be based on the group from which teams qualify or some other
criteria). Another way that cups are modified is between fixed and unfixed cups.
A fixed cup is a cup where there is a single seeding at the start of the cup.
Examples of this are the National Basketball Association and the World Cup
of Football. An unfixed cup is one where seeding may occur not only before the
start but between any round. Examples with an unfixed cup are the National
Hockey League and the UEFA Champions League.
Cups are not necessarily single elimination. A double elimination cup is de-
signed so that a team can lose two games instead of one game. If a team loses,
they play other teams that have also lost until they lose a second time or they
win the final game of the tournament. These tournaments are organized as two
cups where losers enter the second cup at various stages depending on when they
lose their first game. Finally, a round robin competition is a competition where
each team plays every other team a given number of times. In a single round
robin competition, each team plays every other team exactly once. Another com-
mon variant of this is for teams to play a double round robin competition where
each team plays every other team twice, often at home and away.
3 Manipulating the Tournament
A tournament is a directed graph G = (V,E) where the underlying undirected
graph is a complete graph. We assume that the tournament is available for the
remainder of the paper. Every directed edge (vi, vj) ∈ E represents a victory
by vi over vj . The number of the teams in the competition is |V | = m. We
define a manipulation of the tournament as any replacement of an edge (vi, vj)
in the graph with the edge (vj , vi). This is equivalent to a manipulation of votes
but here we are changing the winner directly instead of just changing the vote.
Note that, as in election manipulation where the electoral vote is assumed to be
known, we assume that we know, via an oracle, the relative strengths of teams
and can represent the winner of the contests in the tournament graph. We restrict
manipulations by only allowing the manipulation of an edge (vi, vj) if candidate
vi is a member of the coalition. This restricts the behaviour of the manipulators
to throwing games where they could have won. This restriction is due to the fact
that it is simple to perform worse but more difficult to play better. We consider
two different types of manipulations. A constructive manipulation is one that
ensures a specific team wins the competition. A destructive manipulation is one
that ensures a specific team loses the competition. For round robin competitions,
we generalize the concept of the tournament beyond the simple win-loss scoring
model to a complete graph where the edge (vi, vj) has a non-negative weight wij
which represents the number of points that would be earned by vi when playing
vj in a fair game. We define a manipulation in this case as an outcome where
the points earned in the match are different to those given by the tournament.
However, manipulations are restricted so that the manipulator achieves no more
points and the team being manipulated achieves no less points.
In this section, we restrict ourselves to fixed cups with a known seeding. We
also look just at single round robin tournaments though the results generalize
to multi-round robin tournaments.
3.1 Cup Competitions
For cup competitions, finding a constructive or destructive manipulation of the
tournament is polynomial. Our results make use of results in [3] which shows
that a manipulation of an election using the cup rule can be found in O(m3n)
time where m is the number of candidates and n is the number of voters.
Theorem 1. Determining if a cup competition can be constructively manipu-
lated using manipulations of the tournament takes polynomial time.
Proof. This proof is a bottom up version the proof of Theorem 2 from Conitzer,
Sandholm and Lang (CSL)[3] but substitutes tournament manipulations for vot-
ing manipulations. The basic CSL algorithm is a recursive method that treats
each node in the tree (which is not a leaf) as a sub-election (see Algorithm CSL).
Conitzer et al. [3] note that a team wins a sub-election if and only if they must
win one of its children and they can defeat one of the potential winners on the
other side. It is perhaps simpler to understand this algorithm from a bottom up
perspective. Observe that if we have two leaf nodes vi and vj and there exists an
arc in the tournament (vi, vj) then vi wins the match and is a potential winner
of the sub election between vi and vj . Now suppose that vi is in the member
of the coalition so it is possible for them to replace (vi, vj) with (vj , vi) in the
tournament and therefore vj is also a potential winner of the sub-election via
manipulation. Assume we have some sub-election in the middle of the tourna-
ment with two sets of potential winners A and B. Any team from A is a potential
winner of the sub-election if there exists a team in B that they can defeat or if a
coalition member in B throws a game. The same is true for teams in B. There-
fore, there is a constructive manipulation if the desired winner is a member of
the potential winners at the top node in the cup tree.
The original algorithm looked at O(m2) pairs of opponents as no two teams
were compared more than once. Note that the original analysis provided a looser
O(m3) bound on the number of comparisons, but this can be tightened by an
observation of Vu et al. [12]. The difference between direct manipulation of the
tournament and the method by Conitzer, Sandholm and Lang is that deter-
mining if a team could defeat another team meant summing all values of the n
voters requiring O(n) time whilst in the direct manipulation of the tournament
Algorithm: CSL(vw,c,T ,C)
input : A team vw, a cup tree c, a tournament graph T , and a coalition of
teams C
output : Returns true if vw can win via manipulation and false otherwise
winners ← PossibleWinners(c,T ,C);
if vw ∈ winners then
return true;
else
return false;
Algorithm: PossibleWinners(c,T ,C)
input : A cup tree c, a tournament graph T and a coalition of teams C
output : Returns the set of possible winners of the cup tree via manipulation of
the tournament by the coalition
if leaf( c) then
return {c};
else
winners ← {};
LeftWinners ← PossibleWinners(left( c) ,T ,C);
RightWinners ← PossibleWinners(right( c) ,T ,C);
forall vi ∈ LeftWinners do
if ∃vj ∈ RightWinners such that (vi, vj) ∈ E ∨ vj ∈ C then
add(winners,vi);
forall vj ∈ RightWinners do
if ∃vi ∈ LeftWinners such that (vj , vi) ∈ E ∨ vi ∈ C then
add(winners,vj);
return winners ;
this can be done in constant time. Therefore, constructive manipulation of the
tournament under the cup rule takes just O(m2) time. ⊓⊔
We observe that destructive manipulation of a competition using tournament
manipulations is similar since this simply requires determining if there is at least
one other possible winner of the tournament via manipulations.
Theorem 2. Determining if a cup tournament can be destructively manipulated
using tournament manipulations takes polynomial time.
Proof. We just determine if we can constructively manipulate the tournament
for each other team in turn than the one we wish to lose. ⊓⊔
3.2 Round Robin Competition
For round robin competitions, manipulations of the tournament can be com-
puted in polynomial time for a restricted class of scoring models. We define a
scoring model to be the set of tuples giving the possible outcomes of a game.
Copeland scoring has a simple win-loss ({(0, 1), (1, 0)}) scoring model where
the wining team earns one point and the losing team earns none. Bartholdi,
Tovey and Trick[2] showed that constructive manipulation can be determined in
polynomial time for a chess scoring model ({(0, 1), (12 ,
1
2 ), (1, 0)}). Faliszewski et
al. [4] showed that for a range of scoring models manipulating Copeland voting
is NP-Complete.
First, we discuss the problem of determining which games need to be ma-
nipulated to ensure that a given team vw wins the competition. Clearly, there
are some games that cannot be affected by the coalition and are fixed. All other
games are manipulable. Games between coalition members can earn any of the
possible scores allowed by the scoring model. We restrict games against non-
coalition members by only allowing the manipulator to earn less points and the
non-member earns more. Determining if a given team can be made a winner is
analogous to determining if a team wins a round robin tournament when the
fixed games have been played and the manipulable games have not been played.
The restriction of the outcomes on games between coalition and non-coalition
members requires that the games have outcomes within only a subset of the
scoring model. Using this observation, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Determining if there exists a constructive manipulation of a round
robin competition is polynomial if the normalized scoring model is of the form
S = {(i, n− i) | 0 ≤ i ≤ n} and NP-complete, otherwise.
Proof. This proof uses the equivalence of determining whether a team can win a
tournament and determining if a constructive manipulation exists with a set of
fixed and manipulable games. Note that a game between a non-coalition member
vi and a coalition member vj is unfixed but the scores that can be assigned are
restricted. When the scoring model is of the form S = {(i, n − i) | 0 ≤ i ≤ n}
and the initial result of the game is (ci, cj), then the remaining valid scores that
can be assigned are those from (ci, cj) to (n, 0). By normalizing this new model,
we obtain one in which the non-coalition member earns ci points by default and
the result of the game is scored from the model {(0, cj), . . . , (n − ci, 0)} which
is of the form S = {(i, n − i) | 0 ≤ i ≤ n}. Kern and Paulusma [7] showed
that determining if a team can win a tournament (i.e. is not eliminated from
competition) takes polynomial time if the normalized scoring model is of the
form S = {(i, n− i) | 0 ≤ i ≤ n} and is NP-complete otherwise. ⊓⊔
By comparison, it is always polynomial to determine if a destructive manip-
ulation exists.
Theorem 4. Determining if there is a destructive manipulation of a round robin
competition takes polynomial time.
Proof. Assume that vl is the team that the coalition desires to lose. It is suffi-
cient to check whether the maximum points of another team via manipulation
is greater than the points of vl. If vl is a member of the coalition and therefore
a manipulator, for each team i that we check for points, we apply only manip-
ulations that increase the relative points between i and vl. For all other teams,
we apply the manipulation which decreases the points of vl the most. If vl is not
a member of the coalition, no games involving vl may be manipulated since we
restrict manipulations to allow only those manipulations that increase the points
of vl and increase the relative gap between vl and the manipulator. Therefore,
no other team is better off when games involving vl are manipulated. In both
cases, we apply the manipulation that increase the points of the team under
consideration against all other teams. If the total number of points of any other
team is greater than the points of vl under these manipulations, then there is a
destructive manipulation of vl. This algorithm can be run in O(n
2) time. ⊓⊔
A further complication is when the goal of manipulation is just to earn a
berth in the next round of the playoffs. It is NP-hard to decide these questions
under most playoff systems for all scoring models [9, 5].
4 Minimizing Manipulations
The number of manipulations required is an important factor. It may be ad-
vantageous for the coalition to manipulate as few games as possible to avoid
detection or to minimize the cost of bribing players. We show that there is a
polynomial algorithm to calculate manipulations which throw a minimal num-
ber of games. This highlights the vulnerability of the two most common types
of competitions in sports to manipulation.
4.1 Minimal Number of Manipulations for Cup Competitions
Computing the minimal number of manipulations simply requires keeping a
count within our algorithm for computing a manipulation. We give some nota-
tion to identify a specific sub-election in the cup. We let sviℓ be the sub-election
at level ℓ where vi is a leaf node of a sub tree below s
vi
ℓ . We denote the level
as the height from the bottom of the cup tree, which is assumed to be a perfect
binary tree. We also define level 0 to be the level belonging to the leaves. We
havem2 constants cij that are 1 if (vj , vi) ∈M and 0 otherwise, whereM ⊆ E is
the set of edges which can be manipulated by the coalition. This corresponds to
cij = 1 when a manipulation must occur for vi to win and 0 otherwise. Finally,
we define the minimal number of manipulations needed to win a sub-election
sviℓ , m(vi, s
vi
ℓ ), to be sum of the minimal number of the manipulations for vi to
win one of the children of sviℓ , and the minimum number of manipulations plus
cij over all possible winners of the other child which vi can defeat. We denote
the set of teams that vi can defeat either as described in the tournament or by
manipulation as Di. More formally, the minimal number of manipulations for vi
at sviℓ (ℓ ≥ 0) is given by:
m(vi, s
vi
ℓ ) =
{
0 if ℓ = 0
m(vi, s
vi
ℓ−1) + minvj∈Di(m(vj , s
vj
ℓ−1) + cij) if ℓ > 0
.
Lemma 1. The minimal number of manipulations needed to make a team vi a
winner at level n in the tree is equal to m(vi, s
vi
n ).
Proof. By induction. First, observe that the minimal number of manipulations
at a leaf is 0. Hence, m(vi, s
vi
0 ) = 0 for all leaves vi. Next note that at level
1 there are only 2 nodes in the possible winner sets of the leaves. Therefore
if vi can defeat vj , m(vi, s
vi
1 ) = m(vi, s
vi
0 ) + m(vj , s
vj
0 ) + cij = cij which is
the exact number of manipulations that have occurred to make vi a possible
winner so far. We assume the premise for 1 < n ≤ k. Now, m(vi, s
vi
k+1) =
m(vi, s
vi
k ) + minvj∈Di(m(vj , s
vj
k ) + cij). We know that m(vi, s
vi
k ) is the minimal
number of manipulations for vi up to level k by the assumption and, for every
vj ∈ Di, we know that m(vj , s
vj
k ) is also the minimal number of manipulations
for each vj up to level k. By definition, cij is the number of manipulations for vi
to defeat vj . Since vi can defeat any vj in Di, the one with the fewest previous
manipulations to reach k plus cij leads to the fewest manipulations in total to
make vi win the sub election s
vi
k+1. This equals the minimum over the set Di.
Therefore the lemma holds for k+1 and, by induction, all n levels of the tree. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. A modified CSL algorithm, where the team which minimizes the
value of m(vi, s
vi
n ) is selected to lose to team vi at every node s
vi
n , calculates
the minimal number of manipulations needed to constructively or destructively
manipulate a cup competition in polynomial time.
Proof. By Lemma 1, the value of m(vw, s
vw
n ) at the root node is the minimal
number of manipulations which ensures vw is the winner. Hence, we just need to
show that the algorithm remains polynomial. The modified CSL algorithm still
makes O(m2) comparisons. The only difference is that we have to calculate the
minimum which can be done by storing the minimum as each team is checked.
Therefore, the time complexity remains O(m2) and calculating the minimum
is polynomial. Constructive manipulation requires calculating m(vw, s
vw
n ) whilst
destructive manipulation requires the minimum over all other teams. ⊓⊔
4.2 Minimal Number of Manipulations for Round Robin
Competitions
We consider here just Copeland scoring. We conjecture that similar methods
could be developed for other scoring schemes.
Definition 1. Given a tournament T = (V,E) where V = {v1, . . . , vn}, a set of
manipulable edges M ⊆ E,and a distinguished node vw, the Minimal Number of
Manipulations under Copeland Scoring is the problem of determining the mini-
mal number of edges in M that can be reversed such that ∀vk∈V,vw 6=vk
outDegree(vw) ≥ outDegree(vk).
Note that Copeland Scoring is the simple win-loss method of scoring where
the winning team earns 1 point and the losing team earns 0 points. Before we
show how to calculate the minimal number of manipulations, we show that we
can determine the out degree, i.e. the Copeland Score, of the distinguished node
using a minimal number of manipulations in isolation with a greedy algorithm.
The intuition behind this is that we select manipulations to increase the out
degree of vw.
Lemma 2. The value of outDegree(vw) can be determined in isolation by greed-
ily using, in sequence, a minimal number of manipulations of edges (vi, vw) ∈M
where ∀(vj ,vw)∈M,vj 6=vioutDegree(vi) ≥ outDegree(vj) until ∀vk∈V,vw 6=vk
outDegree(vw) ≥ outDegree(vk).
Proof. First, we prove that it always uses the least number of manipulations to
increase the out degree of vw. To reduce the out degree of two or more nodes
that have an out degree larger than vw, it takes at least two manipulations
but to increase the out degree of vw by the same amount takes just one. For a
single node, it is preferred to use the manipulation involving vw since the other
node may increase the out degree of another node requiring more manipulations.
Therefore, using manipulations involving vw is most efficient.
Now we show that we never overshoot the stopping criteria and use more
than a minimal number of manipulations. Assume that we use more than the
minimal number of manipulations. This means that we selected an edge that
did not decrease the maximum out degree when there existed an edge that
would have decreased the maximum out degree of all nodes that we did not
select. However, since we always selected the edge where the source node had
the maximal out degree withinM , we always decreased the maximum out degree
whenever possible. This is a contradiction and the greedy algorithm only uses a
minimal number of manipulations when reaching the stopping condition. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6. Determining the minimal number of tournament manipulations
required under Copeland Scoring takes polynomial time.
Proof. We define c to be the out degree of the distinguished node, vw, calculated
using the greedy algorithm. This corresponds to the number of wins earned by
vw. If the stopping condition has not been reached, we must use c to determine
how many more manipulations are necessary. We construct a winner determi-
nation flow graph as described by Kern and Paulusma [7] and Gusfield and
Martel[5](See Fig. 1, for example). We add a weight of 1 to each edge (vi, vj)
where (vi, vj) /∈ V and therefore represents a manipulation. All other edges have
the weight 0. The feasible flow which uses the fewest of the non-zero edges is
the minimal number of tournament manipulations to achieve a constructive ma-
nipulation. Since the value of c can be determined in a linear number of steps,
we only need to do a single min cost flow computation, which is polynomial, to
determine the remainder of the minimum number of manipulations necessary to
make vw the team with the highest Copeland score. ⊓⊔
Example 1. An example tournament can be seen in Fig. 1a. There are 5 teams
in this tournament: v0 to v4. Suppose teams v0 and v3 form a coalition to ma-
nipulate the tournament so that v0 wins. We want to determine the minimum
v0
v1
v2
v4
v3
3, 1
1, 2
3, 2
2, 4
4, 3
4, 1
s
v1
v2
v3
v4
t
[1
,
1]
[1
, 1
]
[1, 1
]
[1, 1]
[1, 1]
[1
, 1]
[0, 1]
[0, 1], w = 1
[0, 1]
[0, 1], w = 1
[0, 1]
[0, 1
]
[0, 1], w = 1
[0, 1
]
[0, 1
]
[0, c]
[0, c]
[0, c
]
[0
, c
]
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. (a) The tournament graph for five teams. The distinguished node in the example
is v0 which has formed a coalition with v3. The manipulable edges are (v3, v1), (v3, v2),
(v3, v4), (v0, v1) and (v0, v3). Edges (v1, v2) (v2, v4) and (v4, v1) cannot be manipulated
by the coalition. (b) The min cost flow graph used to calculate the minimum number
of manipulations for a given value constructed from the tournament in Fig. 1a. The
distinguished team is v0, c = 2 and all weights not shown are 0.
number of manipulations needed to ensure that v0 is the winner. This requires
switching any of the arcs where team v3 wins. We know that the value of c = 2
since none of v0’s edges are manipulable in v0’s favour. We construct the graph
seen in Fig. 1b to determine for c = 2 if there is a feasible solution. The solution
returned has a minimum cost which is equal to the minimum number of ma-
nipulations needed to get a feasible flow with the value c plus any used in the
greedy algorithm.
5 Reseeding
If we add multiple seeding rounds then computing a manipulation appears diffi-
cult. Recall that ranked reseeding matches the best remaining teams against the
worst remaining teams in each round. The CSL algorithm cannot therefore be
applied and a general solution is not known. However, if the size of the coalition
is a constant c, then we can determine a manipulation in polynomial time.
Theorem 7. For a ranked reseeding cup competition, if the manipulating coali-
tion is of bounded size c, then determining a set of manipulations that makes a
team win takes polynomial time.
Proof. The key observation is that with a constant sized coalition there are
only a polynomial number of ways to manipulate the games by rearranging
the tournament graph. It suffices to check the winner of each of the polynomial
number of fixed tournament graphs. For each fixed tournament graph, the winner
can be determined in linear time as there are only O(m) matches to check.
We show that there are only a polynomial number of different arrangements
of manipulations. First note that at most c of the m2 matches in the first round
have more than one team as a possible winner. This means that there is at most
2c possibilities to examine after each round. As there are log(m) rounds, we
consider at most (2c)logm (=mc) possibilities. Hence there are at most O(mc)
arrangements of manipulations for an unfixed cup with ranked reseeding and a
constant sized coalition. It is sufficient to check each arrangement, which can be
done in linear time. This gives a polynomial algorithm for bounded c. ⊓⊔
With random reseeding the problem can be separated into two issues: deter-
mining whether manipulation is possible to make a team a winner under every
possible seeding and determining if there exists any seeding such that the coali-
tion can manipulate the games to make a given team the winner. It is unknown
whether either of these problems have polynomial algorithms. Vu et al. [12] and
Hazon et al. [6] tackle some probabilistic variants of possible winners without
manipulation of games. However, the complexity of determining possible winners
with a win-loss tournament graph in balanced cup trees remains open [8, 6, 10].
6 Double Elimination Competitions
In a double elimination competitions, a manipulation of the tournament does
not automatically bounce the manipulator out of the tournament as in the sin-
gle elimination case. However, it does guarantee that the manipulator will be
bounced to the secondary bracket from the primary bracket on the first manip-
ulation and out of the tournament on the second manipulation. As in the case
of ranked reseeding, a general solution is not known but there is a polynomial
algorithm for double elimination tournaments if the coalition is of constant size.
Theorem 8. For double elimination tournaments, if the coalition is of a con-
stant size c, determining whether there is a constructive manipulation takes poly-
nomial time.
Proof. This proof follows similar lines as the proof for ranked reseeding. We will
show that there is a polynomial number of manipulation scenarios which can be
checked in linear time. If there is a coalition of size c then a team can manipulate
the cup only once if they wish to win the tournament and twice if they desire
another team to win. At each step in the tree, a team must decided whether
they wish to manipulate or not. Before and after they have manipulated once,
there remains c teams which can manipulate. Only after they have manipulated
a second time are they removed from the competition. This means there are
at most 2c manipulations at each of the logm levels. This gives us O(2logmc)(=
O(mc)) possibilities that can be checked in linear time, which gives a polynomial
algorithm for determining if there is a constructive manipulation. ⊓⊔
7 Conclusions and Open Problems
In sporting tournaments, teams can directly manipulate the tournament graph.
We showed that algorithms used to compute manipulations of votes in elec-
tions can be modified to determine the manipulations needed of the tournament
graph. We proved that such direct manipulation of the fixed cup and round robin
competitions can be computed in polynomial time. In a similar way, we can de-
termine the minimal number of manipulations needed. For ranked reseeding of
cup competitions, we showed that it is easy to calculate the number of manip-
ulations if the size of the manipulating coalition is bounded by a constant. We
also gave a polynomial time algorithm for double elimination tournaments for a
constant sized coalition. A number of open question remain. The manipulation
of various variations of the cup competition have unknown complexity includ-
ing the ranked and random cup competitions. For random cup competitions,
the complexity of manipulation is also unknown if the size of the coalition is
bounded. Similarly, the complexity of manipulating double elimination compe-
titions is still undetermined when the size of the coalition is unbounded.
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